69th CARF Seminar: Lobbying for Votes: Evidence from Sell-side Analysts’ Site Visits

Friday, October 17th, 2025 10:30 – 12:00（Pre-registration necessary)
※Language: English

Huai Zhang
Professor of Accounting,
Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University

Dr Huai Zhang received his B.A. from Peking University and Ph.D. from Columbia University. He has published papers in the following Financial Times Top-50 journals: Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Finance, Management Science, Contemporary Accounting Research, and Review of Accounting Studies. He is devoted to mentoring young talent, and the majority of his publications are coauthored with his doctoral students. He received the Best Paper Award at the 2004 International Finance Conference and the 2016 Midwest Finance Association Meeting. He was also the recipient of Nanyang Business School Research Excellence Award in 2011, 2013 and 2019. He is the former President of CAPANA (Chinese Accounting Professors’ Association of North America), and the keynote speaker at several accounting research conferences. He is a former editor of Accounting Horizons and current editor of the International Journal of Accounting, an associate editor of Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, and editorial board member of several academic journals, including Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, China Accounting and Finance Review, and Review of Accounting and Finance.

Using hand-collected data on sell-side analysts who participate in New Fortune Star Analyst election, we provide systematic evidence that analysts lobby for star recognition. We argue that one lobbying channel is to conduct joint site visits with institutional investors who vote in the election. Consistent with intensified lobbying incentives before voting, participating analysts conduct more joint site visits, but not more analyst-only visits, during the three months prior to the voting. These joint visits are associated with lower forecast accuracy, reduced price impact, muted market reactions, and lower fund returns, suggesting they are unlikely for information acquisition or client service. Lobbying through joint visits effectively increases the likelihood of winning, but those who likely win via lobbying show inferior future performance. Overall, the results indicate that sell-side analysts lobby through joint site visits to improve star analyst election outcomes.