Monetary Policy and Learning from the Central Bank’s Forecast

東京大学経済学研究科棟 12階 第2共同研究室

武藤一郎 氏

We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in a simple New Keynesian model in which private agents engage in adaptive learning by referring to the central bank's forecast. In this environment, to satisfy the E-stability condition, the central bank must respond more strongly to the expected inflation rate than the so-called Taylor principle suggests. On the other hand, the central bank's strong reaction to the expected inflation rate raises the possibility of indeterminacy of the REE. In considering these problems, a robust policy is to respond to the current inflation rate to a certain degree.

備考: Macroworkshop と共催

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