ワーキングペーパー

金融システム

F-series

作成:

番号:CARF-F-357

Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings (Published in the Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018.)

著者:Hitoshi Matsushima

Abstract

We investigate revenue maximization in general allocation problems with incomplete information, where we assume quasi-linearity, private values, independent type distributions, and single-dimensionality of type spaces. We require a mechanism to satisfy strategy-proofness and ex-post individual rationality. We assume that each player has a type-independent preference ordering over deterministic allocations. We show that the Myerson’s technique to solve the incentive-constrained revenue maximization problem in single-unit auctions can be applied to general allocation problems, where the incentive-constrained revenue maximization problem can be reduced to the simple maximization problem of the sum of players’ marginal revenues without imposing any incentive constraint.

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