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番号:CARF-F-285

Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes (Revised version of CARF-F-121; Forthcoming in "Journal of Economic Theory")

著者:Hitoshi Matsushima

Abstract

This paper demonstrates the theoretical foundation that underlies the willingness of rational arbitrageurs to delay and reinforce the speculative attack. The key assumptions are that there is a small probability that arbitrageurs are behavioral and never time the market of their own accord and it is uncertain whether arbitrageurs are behavioral or rational. We model a stock market as a timing game, in which arbitrageurs compete to react quickest. We show that rational arbitrageurs are willing to ride the bubble for a long period. We also characterize symmetric Nash equilibria and show the sufficient condition for uniqueness.

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